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I propose to consider the position of historical 
practice today, with an emphasis on social his-
tory and particularly from the point when it over-
lapped with the cultural turn. I do not intend to 
offer a complete picture of the trajectories of so-
cial history because that would require a much 
more extensive work, particularly since social 
history is not a unified field of historical practice. 
My purpose is to pose some questions regard-
ing the new possibilities offered by the linguistic 
or cultural turn for social history and to ponder 
the different historical practices today without 
denying the important contribution of social his-
tory to modern historiography. For the purpos-
es of this paper, my presentation begins with a 
short and probably schematic overview of the 
“history of social history” since the last decades 
of the previous century and continues with the 
discussion of the main argument. 
The emergence of social history as a dynamic 
field in its own right can only be traced after the 
end of second world war and particularly dur-
ing the 1960s. When in 1971 Eric Hobsbawm de-
clared that it was a good time to be a social his-
torian, social history was taking the shape that 
would make it the dominant model of historical 
analysis for the next 20 years.1 Certainly the re-
nowned historian did not claim that he invented 
the term social history, but he used it in a very 
confident way to show that it could serve a new 
project in the field of history, namely total histo-
ry, which in his own words meant that “the so-
cial or societal aspects of man’s being cannot 
be separated from other aspects of his being”.2 
Schematically put, this project of social history, 
which here I call structural, combined an em-
phasis on structure and structuration, with the 
scientific optimism that social history would 
make possible the knowledge of history and 
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society as totalities and, finally, with keeping an open mind towards the social sciences which, ac-
cording to Hobsbawm, were at that same time taking their own historical turn. Social history never 
represented a unified field since it encompassed differing research agendas and priorities, most 
particularly Marxism and the Annales school. But there was much common ground. As William 
Sewell suggests, in contrast to mainstream political history, social history combined the study of 
people ignored until then by historical scholarship, like the labouring poor and the working classes, 
with the effort to study and integrate all social experience into a totality or structure.3 New ques-
tions and new categories of documents rapidly broadened the fields of social history and spread 
its influence and attraction. Of course, the arrival of social history to this level of sophistication was 
not sudden but, to a large extent, the outcome of overlapping influences, both internal and exter-
nal to the practice of history. 
Although, as I have suggested, the practice of social history followed different paths, social his-
torians agreed that their work had much to do with the study of structures, most notably eco-
nomic structures. In the 70s the concept of structure was already available and used in various 
professional and nonprofessional historical networks. Although with different twists, structural ap-
proaches were most common among Marxist and neo-Marxist social scientists, Annalistes histo-
rians and anthropologists and linguists of different sorts, particularly in France, Britain and the US. 
Of course these different networks were not identical and one would have all the good reason to 
argue that British Marxists and Annalist historians for example should not be lumped together. One 
could also add that none of these networks were internally unified and coherent. This I concede. It 
is not my intention to proclaim the unity of these networks nor underestimate their methodologi-
cal and epistemological differences and their different intellectual traditions. It is hard to miss the 
point, for example, that most Annalistes historians focused on structures and the longue durée 
whereas Marxists studied social transitions, most notably the transition from feudalism to capital-
ism. Nor, on the other hand, do I wish to disregard the reciprocal influences existing among these 
networks which shaped much common ground.4 All these apart, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that structure as a fundamental category of historical analysis became acceptable to all historians 
who styled themselves social historians. This choice is understood by the fact that structures could 
accommodate and relate different elements or series of elements of an economic, demographic, 
environmental and even cultural nature into a whole. In other words, this new social history was 
founded on the belief that structure and structuration provided the intellectual and methodologi-
cal means for adequate answers to complex questions, explaining composite phenomena in the 
long run – some would say in the very long run. In addition, structures could be put on a hierarchi-
cal axis according to criteria set by networks of historians or social scientists. On this axis, cultural 
aspects were usually placed on the superstructure or the troisième niveau and were reduced to 
some other more fundamental level, most particularly economics. 
Despite the major advances which social history brought to the practice of history, these came at 
a cost, or so one could say with hindsight. The structuralist perspectives tended to marginalise if 
not erase human agency. The idea that agency was determined in more ways than one by imper-
sonal structural factors, some of which were not even comprehensible to human consciousness, 
was at the basis of major historical works, such as the Mediterranean in the Age of Phillip II (1949), 
by Fernand Braudel, who, among others of the Annales school, staged a relentless attack on pre-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:04:27 |
73
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 13 (2013)
viously dominant historical categories and practices, such as the event and narrative for example, 
and proposed new directions of historical analysis using novel perspectives such as the longue 
durée or the three-tiered models of chronicity and histoire-problem. These directions put structure 
and structuration in sharp relief. Long-term processes in geography, the environment, demogra-
phy and the economy were far more important than human agency, whose history Braudel un-
derstood as the traditional history on the scale of individual men which was brief, exciting but also 
dangerous because it was related to their passions, dreams and illusions.5 On the contrary, struc-
ture and structuration appear in the form of a construct that gets in the way of history, hindering 
its flow and shaping it; a structure that, although it may wear out, will last long enough to outlive 
a number of human generations. This “anonymous history, working in the depths and most often 
in silence”, was the realm of the historian, instead of “a history arbitrarily reduced to the role of he-
roes”.6 Structural factors were vital to the framing of social experience and transcended immedi-
ate human experience and short time spans. 
Of course, the project(s) of social history exemplified by the Annales becomes more complicated if 
one takes into consideration the relations with French structuralism. It is well known, for example, 
that particularly in France a war almost broke out between history and structuralism of the Lévi-
Strauss kind.7 The extent of the influence of French structuralism on Annalistes historians remains, 
in my mind, an open question. The radical twist which Roland Barthes or Michel Foucault gave to 
structuralism and the epistemological displacements which prepared the ground for poststructur-
alism were not easily compatible with the line of thought and research of the Annales school. This 
becomes even more complicated if we consider the internal differentiation of this school between 
different “generations” and “sensitivities”. Yet one could discern a strong similarity among the ma-
jor threads of the Annales school and structuralism as regards human agency. The old [male] in-
dividual of humanism, endowed with free and unlimited will, rationality and inherent intentional-
ity, that dominated the historical narratives of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, 
became the target of structuralist attack. Braudel distrusted both human agency and short time 
spans as capricious and delusive departures from historical knowledge. Barthes and Foucault, 
among others, rejected the very idea of intentionality as the free play of self-conscious individuals 
and declared the “death of the author”.8 
Marxist social historians, on the other hand, focused on structures for their own reasons.9 The 
history of Marxist historiography is controversial. Although there are few authoritative histo-
ries of Marxist historiography per se, there are countless discussions about Marx, Marxism and 
history in various publications of case studies or other issues. The emphasis is usually put on 
western Marxism, if not exclusively on British Marxism alone, whereas other variants of Marx-
ism, particularly those developed in the socialist countries, are usually ignored if not trivialised. 
Marxist materialist history, particularly its western variants, inherited the ambivalence of clas-
sical Marxism about the mechanism of social change – that is whether the shift from one mode 
of production to the next is the outcome of class struggle or the consequence of the discrep-
ancies between productive forces and productive relations. Although there was much debate 
among Marxist historians and social scientists, this tension was never adequately resolved. Brit-
ish Marxist historians in particular focused on the agency of the labouring classes but almost 
always in a way which bound them to bigger economic structures. Even E.P. Thompson’s sub-
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tle analysis of working-class culture, with its emphasis on how labouring men constituted their 
own class culture, is not entirely removed from economic reductionism and completely fails to 
see class also as a gendered concept.10 Thompson criticised Althusserian structuralism for its 
insistence on structure and its denial of human agency and, rejecting broad theoretical models, 
insisted on the value of history as a form of explaining historical change through human agen-
cy.11 Despite his ambivalence towards the base/superstructure dichotomy, Thompson did not 
question the objective position of class, only the workings of culture to accelerate or to impede 
class consciousness. Emphasis on structure, in terms of modes of production or the base/su-
perstructure model, was always dominant in Marxist interpretations of social change, thus col-
lapsing agency to structural constraints.The shaping of social history, which Hobsbawm cele-
brated in 1971, was also influenced by factors external to history itself. According to some, these 
factors were associated with major sociocultural trends. William Sewell links the rapid develop-
ment of social history, as a distinct field of historical practice, to the kind of scientific optimism 
which followed Fordist capitalism, this pact among big business, labour and government, greatly 
responsible for the postwar boom and the expansion of university education to accommodate 
the needs of the capitalist organisation of western societies.12 Fordism has produced, Sewell be-
lieves, a predictable form of society which, at the same time, has offered itself to quantifiable and 
accurate knowledge. Others, like Geoff Eley argued that the scientific optimism of the 60s and 
70s, bound as it was to experimentation, openness and interaction between the social sciences 
and history, influenced the practice of history immensely. In Anglo-Saxon and French academic 
environments, interdisciplinarity won the day and many historians sought in sociology a promis-
ing field for renewing their methods and advancing historical specialisation in the form of novel 
subfields such as family history, urban history or the history of youth and childhood.13 However, 
interdisciplinarity seemed at the time a one-way thing: the turn of historians to sociology was 
not reciprocated. Sociologists mostly treated historical works as sources of information and did 
historical work themselves, usually at their own peril, to support their own generalisations be-
cause they often felt that their questions were not answered by existing historical scholarship.14
The structural model of social history dominated the field for more than two decades before it suc-
cumbed to specific pressures and decline. This development was not predictable. The structural 
model was quite successful in providing convincing interpretations of various aspects of social life 
in their interaction and offered, particularly in many of its Marxist forms, interesting though crude 
versions of social change. The linearity and causality underpinning this model increased its appeal, 
particularly among an audience of social scientists searching explanations for social change, al-
though the prevailing metaphor used, that of basis and superstructure, led to the neglect of those 
aspects of social experience that did not fit comfortably with the basic elements of structure. The 
macroscopic perspective of social history grasped history on a big scale, either in terms of a set of 
static but long-term structures, or in terms of a grand narrative of social change, i.e. the passage 
from feudalism to capitalism. All these sounded well until cracks started to appear in the model. 
When did the crisis of this model occur? The answer to this question is complicated and would re-
quire far more space than this short paper commands. One could argue, though, that the structur-
alist perspective reached its limits even at the time when it was most celebrated. As Carlo Ginz-
burg convincingly suggested, the macroscopic perspective could see subaltern classes only under 
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the spectre of anonymity and therefore was unable to conceive the uniqueness of a case such as 
that of the miller Menocchio.15 Ginzburg did not question the universality underpinning the project 
of social history and believed that the microhistorical perspective of his work on the sixteenth-
century mental world of Menocchio could offer useful insights into the popular culture of his age. 
However, Ginzburg made a point regarding the tension existing between structure and agency, 
big and small scale. I think that this tension was vital to the decreasing influence of the structural 
model of social history. The merits of this model were gradually counterbalanced by an emerging 
interest in agency, identity and social representation, all elements of social experience which until 
then had been subsumed by impersonal structures. Of course, one could claim that structuralist 
approaches did not remain unaltered. On the contrary, they became more subtle and open minded 
and, at some point, at least theoretically, even criticised their own theoretical origins which pitted 
agency and structure as exact opposites. Sewell, for example, attempted to reconcile structure and 
agency claiming that society – and history by extension – can only be grasped in relation to multi-
ple and dynamic structures which are in close interaction with multiple forms of human agency.16 
Sewell’s work provides a new and flexible perspective of structure and structuration, far removed 
from older and much more static views of structure common in the social sciences. However, at 
the same time this work was, in my view, an exception. In addition, it became also evident that the 
“social” should not be conceived as self-evident. As Patrick Joyce suggested, both social science 
and social theory considered the “social” as an immovable background, as a “thing”, whose ma-
teriality and, therefore, its distinction with culture was taken for granted.17 Social history inherited 
a long dualist legacy which sharply distinguished the social and the cultural, the material and the 
immaterial, structure and agency, in order to explain historical phenomena in terms of deep un-
derlying causes rather than “superficial” elements. 
The major criticism of the structural model of social history appeared during the 80s when a grow-
ing number of historians took the “linguistic turn”, the “cultural turn”, or the “discursive turn”, all 
infamously ambivalent terms describing a new sensitivity towards language, discourse, repre-
sentation, identity and the symbolic/semiotic.18 Needless to say that the semantics of these terms 
differ slightly, but for the purposes of this article I will use them indiscriminately. I do not suggest 
that these turns, which for many belong to the constellation of theories branded postmodernist, 
represent a decisive and complete break with previous approaches. Certainly there are disconti-
nuities with preceding forms of social history but there are also various overlapping fields of sen-
sitivity, particularly with issues regarding subalterity and history “from below”. But even if my view 
is wrong, even if discontinuities between the “new” and the “old” are strong, I think that we are to-
day beyond the point where a discussion of this kind is useful. I simply rest on the important as-
sumption that the cultural turn successfully challenged major categories of modern social analy-
sis and forced historians to rethink their ways of practicing and thinking about history. This major 
turn must not be seen as a fashionable trend which prioritises cultural over social understanding 
but rather as a way of transcending dichotomies inherent in the epistemological core of social his-
tory in the first place. 
The cultural turn in history met with varying degrees of acceptance, indifference and refusal with-
in academia, the social sciences in particular. Some believe that the methodological eclecticism 
and the celebration of difference which they associate with the cultural turn are serious problems 
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directly affecting the possibility of coherent historical analysis. To many, this new critical idiom 
seemed disheartening if not totally chaotic because, as they argued, it destabilised meaning and 
all certainty of historical explanation. Since the 80s, reactions against the cultural turn have been 
strong and the intensity and bitterness of the intellectual exchanges between the ardent followers 
of the now “old” social history and their critics who took this turn have not yet receded.19 Of course, 
reactions against the cultural turn are not uniform and critics like Richard Evans, Gertrude Him-
melfarb, Lynn Hunt, Joyce Appleby, Victoria Bonnell and Bryan Palmer, among others, cannot be 
lumped together.20 Some of them, for example Hunt and Bonnell, felt that the cultural turn erased 
all references to social context and destabilised standards of judgment completely.21 Evans com-
plained that the cultural turn abandoned scientific history and attacked the rigorous investigation of 
primary sources and objectivity, thus transforming history into a kind of literature.22 Palmer used 
the metaphor of a “descent” (into hell?) to signify the reification of language, the rejection of ma-
terialism and the abandonment of many useful concepts such as class struggle, exploitation and 
revolution, a process that he associated with the cultural turn.23 Although the epistemological and 
political views of these critics differ, it seems fair to suggest that they all defend the idea of his-
torical objectivity24 which was directly questioned by the cultural turn. I do not intend here to enter 
the rough terrain of discussions or polemics which have accompanied this turn since it emerged. 
In a short paper such as this, is impossible to condense the various and sometimes contradictory 
forms of criticism or defence of the cultural turn and its major offshoot in the field of history, new 
cultural history. I will simply indicate that it might not be arbitrary to suggest that the indifference, 
if not the outright hostility, which many, though not all, “mainstream” social historians showed to-
wards the cultural turn seems to stem from an older tradition in social theory which distrusted 
language because its metaphoric slippages and opacity destabilised referentiality and the repre-
sentation of the “real”.25 The alternative was to take for granted that words mean what they say, 
because otherwise, it was argued, one will be left in the chaos of differential meanings and lose 
any prospect of certainty. For many historians, language was and is still very much considered a 
transparent medium of expression whose descriptions are to be judged as true or untrue in terms 
of an extralinguistic and nondiscursive historical reality which particular authoritative interpreta-
tions have raised to the status of the final criterion of truth. Most historical works simply repress 
the connotative nature of language. As Joan Scott put it, there is a strong paradox in the fact that 
historical interpretations create meaningful historical realities – in a sense they “produce” the past 
– at the same time that their legitimacy rests on the mimesis of a reality supposedly existing out-
side the text.26 This was a definite epistemological choice that exiled language from the field of in-
terpretation, considering it strictly a descriptive medium. Particularly in qualitative history, a spe-
cific subfield of practice related mostly with Annalistes social history, the opacity and metaphoric 
nature of language was erased through the conversion of supposedly unintended traces of the past 
(prices, taxes, deaths, births, etc) into series of numbers which allowed the comparison of similar 
things over long periods of time.27
Certainly there is no point insisting that the cultural turn is uniform; on the contrary, any such claim 
would undermine its critical thrust against all totalising discourses. Perhaps one of the major is-
sues is how older distinctions, such as the “social” and the “cultural”, which were at the core of so-
cial history, could be reworked from cultural turn perspectives. As was the case with the “social”, 
the “cultural” is also far from self-evident as it takes various meanings.28 According to Patrick 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:04:27 |
77
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 13 (2013)
Joyce, there are cases where the cultural is ontologised in cultural history, just as the social was 
in social history, with the cost that the “cultural” has become separated from the material and the 
social.29 One should also take into consideration the fact that the cultural turn seems to have come 
as a loan to the study of history. As Eley has pointed out, the gradual passage to approaches that 
emphasised culture and language did not emerge within the practice of history but came about 
under the influence of other disciplines, most notably social anthropology and literary theory.30 The 
linguistic form used by many practitioners of cultural history is another point of consideration. The 
cultural turn required a new form of language because it could not be cast in the available idioms 
of the social sciences or the humanities, something which proved no easy task. Although this was 
not unprecedented – new approaches always fashion their own vocabulary and grammar in order 
to give coherence to their subject matter – the cultural turn has often faced ironical reactions from 
different quarters castigating its linguistic pretensions.
The picture sketched above presents the complexity of the cultural turn and serves as a warning 
that dismissing or trivialising the challenges this turn brought to the practice of history is naïve, 
to say the least. In my view, the cultural turn in history did not lead to a kind of new orthodoxy, al-
though in some cases the high enthusiasm for it may have suggested that it had. This turn stands 
out more as a challenge to the epistemological and methodological certainties commonly found in 
the practice of history and historiography and less as a clear-cut and consistent research agenda. I 
am not suggesting that writing history in this new mode is impossible, as some have claimed, but 
it seems to me that current conditions in the practice of history rather justify new kinds of osmo-
sis than the search for a new orthodoxy, which in any case would be contrary to the suggestions 
of most cultural or sociocultural historians.
All considered, the fact that the cultural turn gained ground within the historical profession begs 
explanation. There is no consensus as to the extent of its ascendance and influence, and probably 
there will never be. But it is rather certain that this turn cannot be understood in academic terms 
alone and must be discussed in relation to the broader framework. Opinions on this issue differ. 
Some, like William Sewell, believe that the shift from social to cultural history and the linguistic turn 
correspond to a major shift from Fordist capitalism to neoliberal capitalism and the new regime 
of “flexibility”. This shift decreased the faith in solid and determining social structures and made 
plausible the idea that even the sphere of the economy was culturally constituted. The cultural turn 
was one of the alternative responses to the flexibility of social and labour relations associated with 
recent systemic transformations, although within the new conjuncture, Sewell seems to suggest, 
the cultural turn lost its critical edge, which was valid against the deterministic forms of social his-
tory of the Fordist era but less so in the present times of globalised capitalism.31 
Gabrielle Spiegel situates the development of the cultural turn and of poststructuralism in general 
in the generation which matured in the 60s and 70s. Poststructuralism represents, she believes, a 
displaced response to the Holocaust, the war and disillusionment with Enlightenment principles. 
Within this particular situation, many lost all confidence in language to signify anything beyond it-
self. Foucault’s genealogies, Derrida’s deconstruction and Lyotard’s postmodernism articulated the 
sense of loss, absence and fragmentation brought by these major, sublime events. Spiegel refuses 
to reduce shifts in historiography, particularly the “dematerialisation of history”, to systemic chang-
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es, but she is willing to accept that shifts in the economy and society in America made room for new 
sensitivities which, in turn, explain the implantation of poststructuralism in American academia.32
Eley, in his turn, suggests that the political transitions of the last four decades exerted pressures 
on the way historians thought about their practices. The dispiriting political experiences of the 80s 
and 90s combined with the crisis of class models of explanation and social causality influenced 
social history and precipitated the cultural turn. He claims that the cultural turn does not represent 
a kind of apolitical history but a new configuration between politics and history which is different 
to the one found in materialist metanarratives of the past. In this framework, older totalising dis-
courses have been supplanted by new historical sensitivities which place much more emphasis 
on fragmentation and pluralism.33
It is certain that a correlation exists between the practice of history and broader economic and 
cultural changes; yet, it would be inappropriate simply to collapse the cultural turn into broader 
changes. I believe that today the practice of history faces both political and epistemological dilem-
mas which cannot be ignored. 
The purpose of questioning older “paradigms” of social history is not only about building new his-
torical narrations but also about crucial cognitive issues which, until recently, were considered 
self-evident. The cultural turn represented a form of postessentialist problématique which a large 
audience within academia, dissatisfied with the line of social causality dominant in social history, 
particularly the various forms of economic reductionism, found promising. By exposing the dis-
cursive and therefore the culturally and historically constituted conventions which made categories 
like class, gender, ethnicity, nation or experience self-evident departures for historical analysis, the 
linguistic turn appealed to many historians disappointed with the reductionism of social history and 
looking for new guidelines in their research and readings. The appeal was even stronger for those 
working to bring to the fore the voices of previously unrepresented subaltern classes and practices. 
Of course, some approaches of social history, particularly those of a Marxist orientation, were not 
indifferent to this issue. The history of the labouring classes and class conflict involved issues of 
agency and social action, though it fell short of considering the processes by which subaltern indi-
viduality was constructed. If agency and experience are not self-evident categories, the need arises 
to rethink them again in ways that take the manner in which the subaltern represents herself in the 
world seriously.34 Of course, this kind of interest is double edged, because however commendable 
it is to bring to the fore the stories of those whom power excluded from history, it should not lead 
to the rehabilitation of the willing subject, or to new forms of essentialism. Be that as it may, one 
cannot do this without reconsidering language and referentiality which, as Manuel Cabrera insists, 
is not about referents but about rules of signification.35 The point is that language could not be tak-
en anymore as a neutral and transparent medium or an expression of an extra- or nonlinguistic 
reality but as an active factor in the making of the “real”. Under this theoretical perspective, crucial 
issues of historical interest like memory, selfhood, community and difference, but also categories 
like class, generation and gender, can be fruitfully rethought and reworked. 
The linguistic turn in (social) history did not simply stem from a deeper critique or resentment to-
wards the structuralist paradigm. It is true, as Eley claims, that the loss of confidence in class mod-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:04:27 |
79
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 13 (2013)
els of social change diminished the explanatory power of social history and of the class-oriented 
model in particular. But this alone cannot explain the shift to cultural history and the linguistic turn, 
at least not adequately. I would agree that this turn fits with the rising new sensibilities introduced 
to the field of history, and social history in particular, under the influence of a postmodern, fluid 
and global social and cultural environment which acknowledged multiplicity and diversity. Within 
this environment, conflicting and contingent dynamics emerged and new claims and expectations 
were brought to the fore by new social movements. Long-term processes, such as the globalisa-
tion of capital, emigration, the making of supranational organisations such as the European Un-
ion, but also the emergence of global issues like global warming and pollution, the resurgence of 
nationalism and neofascism and the diffusion of new technologies, condensed time and space on 
an unprecedented scale and changed horizons of expectation. 
Understandably, all these changes brought about serious challenges to existing social and cul-
tural identities and destabilised all sense of certainty. Rethinking identities in this emerging global 
framework proved difficult, demanding and contradictory, but in any case it required, in my mind, 
a turn to history and historicity. No doubt, global capitalism is a major force of change today, and 
most of the time for the worse. If our condition of existence is uncertainty, if all kinds of certainty 
of space and position become displaced and decentred, then the “old” languages of modernity are 
inadequate and new idioms, concepts and mental equipment are required. Displacement as ma-
jor feature of the new postmodern condition applies not only to movements of displaced people 
searching for new homelands to replace “lost” ones, but to all sorts of displacement from previous 
certainties and the forms of agency they instigated. 
I believe that, in the field of social history, many historians were influenced by these developments 
and tried to react to these new sensibilities rethinking gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation and class, 
and their dynamic relationships. But it is difficult if not impossible now to build a new grand narra-
tive which could accommodate everything in a common texture. Issues such as the above-men-
tioned do not fit some sort of totality but should be seen as fields of difference, fields which produce 
difference, and, thus, they cannot serve or be subordinated to a total, universal narrative. There-
fore, the claims and expectations which one could have today from social history are not similar 
to those of the 60s and 70s. The scientific optimism and the search for totality that dominated the 
research agendas during those fascinating times are now misplaced. The collapse of grand nar-
ratives and the distrust in objectivity can now be situated within the power/knowledge nexus and 
associated with the certainty that knowledge and ideology are not as distinct as we once believed.
Next to the need to study gender, ethnicity, sexuality, class, etc, as distinct but overlapping fields 
where difference is produced, the advent of epistemological questions about the politics and na-
ture of historical knowledge created a new intellectual and cognitive environment which could not 
be dissociated from what is commonly known as identity politics. I understand identity politics as 
a specific sphere only partly overlapping with official politics, being at the same time unstable and 
internally differentiated. Closely associated with subject positions regarding sexuality, gender, eth-
nicity or forms of cultural hybridity, identity politics do not easily correspond to already available and 
acceptable forms of practice or concepts of community and solidarity found in the dominant politi-
cal or unionist discourse of the right or left. The tension between identity politics and pre-existing 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:04:27 |
Trajectories of Social History: A Report
80
networks of political mobilisation is put in sharp relief in and through language. Is it possible to de-
fine the experiences of displaced persons/groups, of groups of unorganised workers of particular 
ethnic backgrounds or of groups of “nonconventional’ sexual orientation with the kind of language 
used in ordinary political discourse? Does the appeal of universality still stand for all those who live 
on the margin or relate their existence to local or particularistic identities? And what are we to do 
with the tide of resurgent nationalisms which are once again claiming primordial and rigid identi-
ties to oppose the inroads of “cosmopolitanism” and globalisation? Is it enough to proclaim them 
obsolete or simply reduce them to the shifts of global capital? I believe that we live in a world of 
constant change, a world with many uncoordinated centres which cannot be easily reduced to one 
supracentre which foresees, plans and decides everything. Global capital is simply a metaphor to 
signify a multitude of changes which restructure experience and expectation and fuel uncertainty 
and displacement. But a return to a previous state of certainty is impossible, if this certainty ever 
existed. Identity politics are part of our new global condition and the only way to understand them 
is to take them seriously. 
Reactions towards identity politics, particularly from the left, had much in common with the reac-
tions against the cultural turn, often to the point where these two phenomena appeared to be iden-
tical. In both cases, criticism indicates the lack of substantial politics which lead to various confus-
ing particularisms or “culturalisms” at the expense of the big picture. Hobsbawm was quite critical 
and claimed that identity politics were not in position to serve the universal ideals of socialism and 
the left because, as he put it in an article, “identity politics is essentially not for everybody but for the 
members of a specific group only”.36 Written some time before the Labour Party under Tony Blair 
won the 1997 elections, the article did not address historians in particular but the general public. 
According to Hobsbawm, issues of difference pertinent to identity politics are simply redundant or 
of marginal interest. We all live with a set of different identities which shift and change, but one of 
these may take the lead and dominate our being and political affiliation in times of uncertainty. Iden-
tity politics are therefore a kind of anachronism which exists only because situations of uncertainty 
still survive. Putting class apart, other forms of difference seem to obscure real politics if not his-
tory itself. On another occasion, Hobsbawm discussed the relation of identity politics and history, 
taking issue with local and particular historical memories. He claimed that local memories, how-
ever important for local identities, are usually at odds with the professional standards of history, 
a subtle way of calling them wrong. “Rhetorical constructions” in the field of local memory simply 
confuse fact and fiction, the local and the global, and their only function is the celebration of the lo-
cal.37 Hobsbawm is not alone in this. Arif Dirlik moves in a parallel direction when he claims that 
the proliferation of identities and histories could be liberating to the extent that they reveal hitherto 
suppressed voices, but they come at the cost of unleashing resurgent culturalisms, which draw 
rigid boundaries around imagined selves and communities.38 The proliferation of histories has put 
forward different truth claims which deny any possibility of coherent narrativisation. The question 
is not whether histories can be true or objective but, distinct as they claim to be, “whether they may 
be containable to something called history”. Therefore, Dirlik concludes, this situation does not end 
up in alternative futures but in an opaque and uncertain future for all. A similar argument is put 
forward by Manu Goswami, in her review of Eley’s A Crooked Line. Goswami insisted that – com-
pared with the historical materialism that served future-oriented narratives, gave meaning to the 
historical present, reconstituted social totality and impelled the struggles of dominated groups – 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 22:04:27 |
81
HISTOREIN VO
L
U
M
E
 13 (2013)
the turn to cultural history, and obviously the cultural turn, was burdened with pessimism and the 
conviction that systemic critique and social transformation are impossible.39 
Critiques such as these mentioned above are not only unfair but they miss the point almost com-
pletely. First of all, there is no strict correlation between the cultural turn in history and identity 
politics. The cultural turn, though nothing near being a coherent project yet, acknowledges plural-
ism and multiplicity as a working hypothesis but is far removed from all kinds of fundamentalism 
or essentialism. On the other hand, identity politics are not uniform and could end up in different 
agendas and claims of identity. Some in particular did use forms of rhetoric which bind identities to 
nature or other kinds of essentialist discourse. Although this choice could be seen as an empow-
ering strategy of the dispossessed or of those who feel threatened,40 it could create impressions 
of authenticity or primordiality. This rhetoric should not be confused with the cultural turn. On the 
contrary, the reduction of identities to nature was very well embedded in western modernity and 
the Enlightenment tradition, first as a weapon against despotism and religion and then as a con-
ceptual schema much used and misused in various contexts during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. On the other hand, identity politics should not be considered as a naïve and static form 
of politics in the recent wave of globalisation. As Judith Buttler suggested, one should not under-
stand identity politics in terms of factionalisation, where one identity excludes another, but as a field 
where one identity comes to find its conditions of possibility in another. Identities are relational and 
difference is the condition that makes identity possible.41 Therefore, the common belief among his-
torians who adopted the cultural turn that different narratives and identities should not be subordi-
nated to a new grand narrative, or essentialist narratives of smaller scale, does not leave the es-
sentialist presumption found in identity politics beyond criticism.42 For Hobsbawm, Dirlik, Goswami 
and many others, there is a point beyond which the deconstruction of venerable analytic categories 
should not be allowed for both political and cognitive purposes. Otherwise, all possibilities for co-
herent interpretation and knowledge will be lost. Here one could be left with the strong suspicion 
that the only venerable category that deserves this honour is class, as the “rest” – gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality, age, etc – hardly could go through the threshold of “serious” analytic categories, far less 
pass the gates of meaningful social experiences. But in this way, we simply repeat the certainties 
of scientific fundamentalism and sidestep all issues inherent in the project of total history as well 
as the politics of difference which exist in the practice of history. 
On the face of all that, one may wonder whether a return to social history as it was practiced is de-
sirable. This may sound like an exaggeration or even provocation given the number of historians 
who are faithful to the project of social history and very reluctant to accept the values of the cultural 
turn. But I believe that the question stands in the sense that, for better or worse, we all have expe-
rienced a major shift in the practice of history, a shift which, as Thomas Osborne has suggested, 
must be seen as an advance and not a threat to social history.43 Within the current decentred field 
of historical practice, some trends are attempting to bring back aspects of social history. The ma-
terial turn for example provides a fresh look at a number of issues, most prominently materiality 
and the human/nonhuman distinction. Rather than insisting on the return of the material, this turn 
problematises supposedly self-evident distinctions like the material and the cultural and probes 
the intricate relations between the material and power.44 But if the material turn is to rework the 
concept of the social, it must implicate the cultural in one way or the other. How can we reflect on 
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the material and materiality without taking account the discursive foundation of materiality and the 
fact that agency is established not only through material acts but also through concepts of mate-
riality? What I want to suggest then is that we cannot rethink the course of social history without 
considering the deep impress of the cultural on the practice of history. If this hypothesis stands, 
then the reshaping of social history should take into serious account the discursive and the sym-
bolic and rethink existing notions of “reality” and “truth” in terms of plurality and difference but not 
totality. I understand that there is no consensus on this issue. Many believe that in times of uncer-
tainty and neoliberalism, such as these we are now living, the return to grand narratives and solid 
identities is a sound political and ethical choice. In consequence, they seek the return to a form of 
social history programmatically linked to the prospect of social change while they openly dismiss 
cultural history and the historians who took this turn, blaming them for naïve eclecticism, cultur-
alism and the failure to say anything of value regarding a future-oriented prospect. I understand 
the nub of the argument but I object – and here I think I am in agreement here with Eley – that we 
are not told where to look for this bright future and which future this should be, because this is far 
from self-evident. Some would argue that this position is nonpolitical, because it avoids direct po-
litical implication, but this is not the case. The pluralism of interpretations, identities and narratives 
may sound banal today but it still has the merit of leaving much room to rethink our practices and 
categories of thought in relation to a fast-changing world, producing new and contingent fields of 
difference which challenge our casual models of understanding. If we accept that, then we might 
also accept the need to rethink the “political” and political implication differently. At the moment, 
the only alternative is a history in fragments. Is this desirable? Maybe we still need to cover a sub-
stantial distance before we rethink again the benefits of grand narratives, but not before we learn 
to work with pluralism and multiplicity and, as historians, acknowledge the metahistorical founda-
tions of our own convictions and orientations.
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